British Unions in Decline: An Examination of the 1980s Fall in Trade Union Recognition by Richard Disney et al.
NBER WORKINGPAPERSERIES
BRITISH UNIONS IN DECLINE AN
EXAMINATION OF THE 1980S FALL




Working Paper No. 4733




Helpful commentsandsuggestions were received from three anonymous referees and seminar
participants at the 1993 Royal Economic Society Conference at York, the Employment
Research Unit Conference on "Unions on the Brinkw at Cardiff; the Fall 1993 NBER Labor
Studies meeting and at a DCI. Applied Microecononietics seminar. Neil Millwaid was
especially helpful both in providing comments and in making available some of the data
described in the paper. The authors would like to thank the Economic and Social Research
Council and the Employment Market Research Unit of the Department of Employment for
financial support, and Martin Conyon and Jeremy Waddington for providing some of the
industrial data used in the paper. The data used in this paper will be supplied to other
researchers on request to Amanda Gosling. Institute for Fiscal Studies, 7 Ridgmount Street,
London, WC1E 7AE, UK. This paper is part of NBER's research program in Labor Studies.
Any opinions expressed are those of the authors and not those of the National Bureau of
Economic Research.NBER Working Paper #4733
May 1994
BRiTISH UNIONS IN DECLINE: AN
EXAMINATION OF ThE 1980S FALL
IN TRADE UNION RECOGNI11ON
ABSTRAa
The authors analyze establishment-level data from the three Workplace Industrial
Relations Surveys of 1980, 1984 and 1990 to document and explain the sharp decline in
unionization that occurred in Britain over the 1980s. Between 1980 and 1990 the proportion of
British establishments which recognised manual or non-manual trade unions for collective
bargaining over pay and conditions fell by almost 20 percent (from 0.67 to 0.54). The evidence
reported demonstrates the importance of the interaction between the labour market, the product
market, employer behaviour and the legislative framework in detemiining union recognition status
in new establishments. The sharp fall in trade union recognition appears to be largely driven by
a failure to achieve recognition status in establishments set up in the 1980s. These results, when
taken in conjunction with recent changes in the nature of employment in the British labour
market, seem to paint a bleak picture for unions and there appears to be no reason why the
decline in union activity should not continue into the 1990s.
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Declining unionization has been one of the most significant features of the British
labour market in the 1980s. All conventional measures of union presence and power vividly
demonstrate this. The proportion of British establishments which recognised manual or non-
manual trade unions for collective bargaining over pay and conditions fell by almost 20
percent (from 0.67 to 0.54)between1980 and 1990 (Millward et al., 1992); the proportion
of workers covered by a collective agreement fell from 0.71 in 1984 to 0.54 in 1990
(Millward et aL, 1992); aggregate union membership fell from 13.2 million in 1980 to 9.9
million by 1990; the corresponding fall in aggregate union density was from 54 percent to
38 percent (and it has continued to fall post-1990). The longer time series profile of
aggregate union density (defined as the number of union members divided by the total
worlcforce), pictured in Figure 1, shows that declines in the 1980s have completely reversed
the gains achieved in the 1970s. Union density now stands at its lowest level for 30 years.
A recent survey of trends in union activity in the British labour market is provided
in Mason and Bain (1993).' They evaluate and appraise the (relatively large) literature
which has attempted to explain longer term trends in unionisation and the smaller body of
evidence that has analysed the sharp decline of the 1980s. There are few British studies,
however, that analyse microeconomic data on workplaces or individuals at different points
in time and most concentrate on union membership density as the variable to be explained.
In this paper we use microeconomic establishment-level data from the three
Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys2 to document and explain the sharp 1980s decline
in union activity. We differ from the studies referred to above (notably Beaumont and
Harris, 1993) in that we focus on establishment-level recognition of trade unions for the
1purposes of determiningpayand conditions of employment as our measure of unionization.
BeaumontandHarris, fi,r example, use the panel element of the 1984 and 1990surveys to
focus on within-establishment declines in union density which they argue drives changesin
unionrecognition. Onthe contrary we study the wider, nationally representative samples of
workplaces in the three cross-sections (the sample of establishments in thepanelis much
morerestricted: for example, by definition the panel excludes all those workplaces under
6 years old and it looks only at trading sector establishments). In addition, we view the
extent of recognition, rather than union membership or density, as the key determinant of the
effects of unions on economic outcomes? For example, in an earlier piece (Disney, Gosling
and Machin, 1993a; secalso Gregg and Naylor, 1990) the variation in union density across
establishments was itself shown to be principally driven by the extent of union recognition.
Our empirical analysis attempts to weigh up the relative importance of compositional
changes versus within-group changes in unionism, to develop an econometric model of the
detennination of union recognition status and, lastly, to discover whether the observed
changes are temporary or cyclical (whereby they may be reversed in the future) or if they
reflect a more permanent trend. Whether any particular explanation of the union decline
dominates is extremely important, both for trade unions and employers, and has implications
for the overall functioning of the labour market. It is well established that unions affect a
range of economic outcome? (wages, employment, productivity, profits) and that wage,
employment and profit determination is different in unionized and non-unionized labour
markets. Hence, whether or not companies have trade unions in their workplace is important
for their corporate performance. Unions also affect other outcomes. The 1 980s has seen a
significant rise in wage inequality (see Gregg and Machin, 1993) and unions have
2traditionally been seen as a force for pay equality) If the observed union decline is not
secular and reflects a long-term trend than we would presumably, in the absence of other
offsetting effects, see continued growth in the inequality of the pay received by different
workers. It is therefore important to evaluate the reasons for union decline and to stress that
the l980s decline in unionization is interesting not only for its own sake but also for what
it implies about the nature of and reward for work in the future.
if. What Hannened to Union Recoenition in Britain Between 1980 and 1990?
The Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys
The three Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys of 1980, 1984 and 1990 are the
most widely-used and commonly cited surveys on industrial relations in British
establishments.The surveysare nationally representative surveys of establishments that
employ at least 25 workers (thesamplingframe is based on the Census of Employment dated
three years before each survey).' In recent years, the data have been quite heavily used by
both labour economists and industrial relations researchers to examine a variety of issues.'
Establlsbment-Level Unionization, 1980-90
Table I uses the establishment-level data from the surveys to document the decline of
union recognition for both manual and non-manual workers across all establishments and in
different sectors of the economy (the public sector, private sector manufacturing and non-
manuficturing).Between1980and1990 the proportion of establishments which recognised
trade unions for manual workers fell by around 13percentagepoints or 21 percentof the
31980 mean(from 0.61to0.48); non-manual recognition fell by about 7 percentage points
or 15 percent (from 0.50 to 0.43). Declines in the proportion of establishments with
recognised unions are observed between 1980 and 1990 for all the disaggregated groups
reported in the Table for both manuals and non-manuals. The sharpest declines have
appeared within the areas where unions have been traditionally strong, namely manual
workers in manufacturing(the declinethere is a massive 25 percentage points fall or 34
percent compared to the 1980 mean).
Table U reports the same exercise for establishment-level union density between 1980
and 1990 and for union coverage between 1984 and 1990 (data on coverage was not available
in the first survey). The pattern looks very similar to that traced out by the recognition
variables in Table 1. There are some differences (e.g. the 1984-90 fall in coverage in the
public sector suggests a sharper decline, which is largely due to the removal of collective
bargaining machinery for teachers and nurses), but the Table demonstrates the main trends
depicted in Table I, namely that falls in unionization have been very marked, and more
marked in private sector manufacturing, the traditional stronghold of private sector unionism.
Decomposition of Changes in Union Recognition Status
It is well known that changes in the composition of employment have simultaneously
occurred as the 1980s saw large shifts away from manufacturing to services, away from
manual to non-manual employment, from full-lime to part-time work, male to female
employment and so on. As such the changing nature of employment has involved a shift
towards those areas where unions have traditionally been less well represented (see, for
example, Green, 1992).
4The relative importance of declines within the three groups in Table I venus declines
arising from compositional changes can be easily evaluated. One can decompose the
aggregate change in the proportion of establishments with recognised unions, say AX, in the
following manner
Ax =AxJ+Ax2?2+AxJ+ +
wherea bar denotes a 1980-1990mean,X is the proportion of establishmentswith
recognisedunions amongst the establishments in group i and f4 is the relative frequency of
group i among all establishments. The first three terms relate to within-group changes and
the last two terms reflect compositional (or between group) shifts. The results are shown in
Table mandpictured in Figure II. Half of the decline in manual recognition is explained
by the decline inside the manufacturing sector. For manual workers compositional changes
between these three broad sectors explain less than 15 percent of the total 1980 to 1990
change. For non-manual workers both the decline within the public sector and the declining
share of public sector employment in total employment are important, but no single effect
dominates.
Simple Logit Models of Union Recognition Status
The nature of the decomposition results are further drawn out by the simple logit
models of union recognition that we report in Tables Wa and IVb. These are purely
descriptive econometric models which attempt to disentangle the relative importance of
potential determinants of union status. In addition to the sectoral classifications used in the
decomposition, we treat recognition as a function of establishment size and workforce
5characteristics since they are likely to determine the expected costs and benefits of
unionization (e.g. if unions give workers access to collective voice this will have more of an
effect in larger establishments where there is a greater need for more formal channels of
communication). Furthermore, there are important reasons as to why establishment age
affects union status relating to life cycle, attrition and changing circumstances at set up date.
These are discussed in more detail below. We thus include a dummy variable indicating
whether the establishment is over 25 years old (20 in 1990)
Several important results emerge from consideration of the regressions in Table IV.
Pint, the cross sectional decline in union recognition between 1980 and 1990 is not fully
explained by the estimated models. In the pooled sample for both manuals and non-manuals
the estimated coefficients on the 1980 and 1984 sample dummies are large, statistically
significant and positive indicating that the trend in unionization is not entirely explained by
the decline in the relative share of public sector establishments, manufacturing
establishments, and the other controls.
Secondly, in most specifications recognition appears to be determined differently in
private sector manufacturing than in private sector non-manufacturing and in the public as
compared to the private sector as theparameter stability tests at the base of the Tables
show. For manual recognition, the estimated coefficient on the dummy variables indicating
private manufacturing status shows a sharp decline from 0.814 (marginal effect =0.143)to
0.259 (marginal effect =0.056)between 1980 and 1990 reinforcing the result that there have
been large declines within manufacturing that are not explained by the independent variables
included in the logit models.'
The third result of note is that establishment age is found to be an extremely
6important determinant of recognition in all years (for manuals) and its effect is clearly
increasing over time (for both groups of workers). One should be a little careful here since
the definition of the age variable differs across years9 but, even given this, there does appear
to be an important shift. For example, in the manual specifications in Table Wa, the
marginal effect associated with the coefficient on age more than doubles, rising from 0.07
in 1980 to 0.18 in 1990.'° Hence, between 1980 and 1990 there is a large ceteris paribus
increase in the probability that unions are recognised in older establishments.
ifi. The Imnortance of the Establishment Aae Effect
Modelling Procedure
Establishment age will be a determinant of the probability of recognition if there is
some inertia in the determination of union status or if older establishments are consistently
different from newer ones. It will also be important as a time related variable if, for one
reason or another, the organising ability of unions or the ability of employers to resist unions
shifts over time.
Existing evidence suggests that recognition is usually a once and for all decision made
at some point early in the lifetime of the establishment.Recognition changes in existing
establishments have remained uncommon even in the 1980s. Evidence suggests that
derecognifions were almost unheard of up to about 1984, but some derecognitions occurred
in the mid-to-late 1980s (see Claydon, 1989)." In the 1990 Workplace Industrial Relations
Survey managers of non-union workplaces were asked if they had a recognised union in
1984: only 2 percent of the private sector sample stated that they had. Beaumont and Harris
7(1993) examine thepanel element of the 1984 and 1990 surveys (whichcovers537 trading
sector establishments)and state that"the vast majorityofestablishmentsdidnot change their
union(non-union) status in the years 1984-90". Similarly, although the company-level
survey of Gregg and Yates (1991) reported a number of partial recognition changes (i.e.
derecognition for a single skill group in an establishment, or in a single establishment of a
multi-establishment company), they found very few cases of complete derecognition. Smith
and Morton (1993) confirm this and attribute it to the significant fixed costs associated with
changing the union status of establishments.
Accepting this once for all nature of the union recognition decision what are the
reasons for variations in recognition over time? Three broad mechanisms through which
establishment age can affect union recognition status suggest themselves:
(i) Life cycle effects: If at any point in lime the probability that a non-union establishment
starts to recognise a union is greater than zero and recognition is a once and for all decision
then the cumulative probability of recognition must be higher in older establishments. A
greater share of newer establishments in the total stock of establishments in the 1980s would
therefore predict lower union recognition.
(ii) Attrition effects: if there are unobservable factors that both determine the expected
lifetime of a workplace and unionization and/or the expected life span of an establishment
is determined by union status then these will be picked up by the coefficient on age. One
example is that "unions kill firms" via their rent-seeking activities (Freeman and Kleiner,
1993); this is discussed in more detail later.
(iii) Time varying covariates: it is not the age of the establishment per se that matters for
recognition, but the prevailing conditions in the economy and the industry when the
8establishment was set up that affect the likelihood of union recognition.Thus an
establishment set up in the 1960s is more likely to recognise a union than one set up in the
1980s not because it is 20 years older but because the conditions in the 1960s were more
favourable to unionization than in the 1980s.
The expected future path of unionization depends crucially on which of these factors
is dominant. Under the first two mechanisms the level of unionization is literally detennined
by the age structure of establishments. If the last mechanism is of most importance, then
given the nature of the legislative and macroeconomic climate and trends in the changing
nature of employment (all of which seem set to continue into the 1990s), new establishments
will be much less likely to become unionized and the observed decline in recognition can be
expected to continue into the 1990s.
Analysis of the three Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys suggests that time
varying covariates are a potentially important determinant of the relationship between union
status and establishment age. Firstly, the actual question in the surveys from which the age
variable is constructed concerns the age of the workplace at its current address (see footnote
9 where the question is reproduced): thus it includes establishments that have moved (to
larger premises, for example). In the 1990 survey questions were asked to determine which
establishments were not in fact new establishments but were movers and among these movers
whether the move took place with the workforce intact and so on. The relationship between
unionrecognitionand age is not significantly different between these three groups. Thus
while moving may enable management to re-evaluate its industrial relations strategy (as in
the case of Wapping for the newspaper industry) there appears to be no mechanism by which
it should change the expected life path of the establishment: this would be necessary if the
9first two effects discussed above were dominant.
The second reason for the claim that what matters is the date that the establishment
was set-up rather than its age is demonstrated below. In the 1990 survey the question on
establishment age was continuous (up to 20 years old) and thus we know the exact year in
whichthe workplacewas 'born'. If attrition or life cycle effects were dominant we would
expect a smooth (if not linear) mean relationship between age and recognition. This is
simply not the case. The age dated paths of avenge recognition proportions plotted in
Figure m mirror the aggregate union density series in Figure I but, the overall downward
trend apart, do not display a smooth relationship.
Our final reason is the statistical importance of age of establishment dated regressors
in econometric models of the determinants of recognition status and we turn to this next.
Rather than just including age in a recognition equation we next evaluate the importance of
various variables dated to the time of establishment set up. This is clearly an attractive
procedure since it gives us information on what determines union status in the first instance
and draws out the historical aspect of the recognition decision.
Model Specification
What time-specific factors are likely to affect the probability of recognition? Three
groups of time-varying factors (which need not necessarily be mutually exclusive) can be
separated:
(i) Economic factors: union status can be seen to be the outcome of a bargain, implicit or
explicit, between management and unions at or around the time at which the establishment
was set up. Product market structure at the time of the bargain will influence the relative
10costs and benefits to management and unions of achieving or resisting unionization and thus
condition the level of resources they will be prepared to sacrifice to achieve the desired
outcome (see Abowd and Father, 1990, or Disney et aX., 1992, for an extended discussion
of these issues). It is also likely that there are factors which determine the balance of power
in the labour market and the probability of new recognitions. One obvious labour market
structure variable reflecting this is the extent of unionization among comparable
establishments.
We utilise two variables in our empirical work to model product and labour market
structure at establishment set up date. We model the product market by including industry-
level profits per head (qUasi-rents per worker)'2 at the date of set up (as in our earlier paper
based only on private sector manufacturing, see Disney et al., 1992, l993b). This proxies
the expected rents over which the employer and union can bargain and hence the expected
gain (loss) of unionization. The relationship is expected to be non-linear (see Disney et a!.
1992). Unfortunately data on this variable is not available for non-manufacturing or for the
public sector. Our labour market structure variable, industry union density at set up date,
is however available for all three sectors.
(ii) Legislative factors: the Conservative government elected in 1979 introduced a range of
anti-union legislative measures. Whilst it is hard to ascribe an effect to legislation on the
basis of time effects (though this is exactly what Freeman and Pelletier, 1990, do) we can
attempt to evaluate this route by considering whether or not a post-1979 shift in the
probability of recognition occurred. Specifically, we incorporate a dummy variable equal
to one if the establishment was set up after 1979 in our logit regressions of the determinants
of recognition.'3
11(iii) Macroeconomic factors: a lot of earlier labour economics and industrial relations work
has emphasisedthe role of thebusiness cycle in shaping union status. We experiment with
several macroeconomicindicatorsat thedate of setup:specificallywe allow potential roles
for GDP growth,unemployment andinflation.
Estimates of Establishment-Level Union Recognition Equations
Table V examines the importance of these time-dated variables in affecting manual
union recognition. It is not surprising, given the time series profile of establishment age
dated recognition illustrated in Figure ifi, that the variable indicating whether or not the
establishment was set up in the 1980s proves extremely important. Establishments that were
set up in the eighties are significantly less likely to recognise trade unions. As noted above
it is hard to reconcile this with the life-cycle and attrition explanations of the importance of
establishment age. Hence, much of the focus in Table V is on the importance of this 80s
effect in conjunction with the other time-dated variables.
Three specifications are reported in Table V for each sector. The first is a simple
logit regression of manual union recognition on the "Established in the 1980? variable; the
second includes the age-dated economic factors relating to labour and product market
structure; the third includes those macroeconomic factors found to be important over and
above the other effects. In the private manufacturing and non-manufacturing equations the
1980s effect is strongly negative and statistically significant. The magnitude of the effect is
sizable: private sector manufacturing establishments set up in the 1 980s were ceteris pan bus
some 30 percent less likely to recognise manual unions than other private sector
manufacturing establishments (column (2));within non-manufacturing the analogous
12probability was about 18 percent (column (5)))4 This drives home the point made above
that much of the union decline isgoing on withinsectors. Unionsarefinding it harder to
achieve recognition status both where they used to be strong (private sector manufacturing)
and inthe newersorts of establishments that are becoming increasinglymoretypical of the
British labour market (private sector non-manufacturing).On the strength of this,it is hard
toimagine thisdeclinebeing arrested in the l990s.
In the privatesectorthe other setupdated variablesperform well.In manufacturing
theindustryquasi-rents per head variables show the stable,quadraticrelationshipthatwe
havereported in earlier work (Disney et al., 1992,1993b).'5Similarly, industry
unionisationat lime of set up has.a strong positive impact on the likelihood of manual union
recognition. It is relatively hard to find any important role for macroeconomic factors: the
most marked effect over and above the other time-varying controls came from an aggregate
GDP growth variable, the coefficient on which only suggests a very weak pro-cyclical pattern
intheability of unions to achieve recognition status in the private sector (other
macroeconomic variables were statistically insignificant as the Likelihood Ratio statistics at
thebase oftheTabledemonstrate).
Inthepublic sector it proves harder to isolate any important effects. This is(at least
partially)downtothe ftct that, unlike the other sectors, unionised bargainingis still the
dominantmode ofpay determination. Thecoefficienton the80svariable is estimated to be
negative but insignificant and, if anything, the GDP growth variable suggests a counter-
cyclical pattern. Overall, it appears (not surprisingly) that the time series pattern of public
sector recognition is driven by other factors. This seems plausible as the likes of competitive
tendering and subcontracting by non-union employers are probably more likely to bethe
13plincipal factors shaping the more modest fall in public sector unionism.
Evaluation of Results and Consideration of Alternative Hypotheses
The results point to an important fail in private sector union recognition that is
inherentlylinkedto a failure to achieve recognition status in newer establishments. Several
factorscouldlie behind this. Those that havebeenemphasised aspotentialexplanations of
union decline in the United States are: compositional changes; unfavourableshiftsin public
opinion towards unions; increased management opposition; reduced demand for union
representation. There is some debate but the US work seems to rule out compositional
changes and increases in anti-union sentiments with the debate falling between those who
emphasise increased opposition of employers (Freeman, 1986; Freeman and Kleiner, 1990)
and fallingdemand(Farber and Krueger, 1993).
In the UKcase itseems that one canalso ruleout the compositional changes
hypothesis for (at least) two reasons. Pint, the results in Table ifi suggest that between-
sector shifts are relatively unimportant. Second, many of the compositional shifts that are
supposed to be bad for unions (e.g. increased female participation, moves towards an
increased share of non-manual workers and service sector employment) occurred in both the
1970s and the 1980s when unionization respectively increased and decreased.
The notion that attitudes towards unions became more unfavourable in the 1980s also
receives no support. The annual Gallup political opinion poll asks those surveyed the
following question:
GeMTCJIy speaking,doyou think trade unions are a good thing or a bad thing?
Figure IV piots the responses to this question between the mid-1950s and 1990. In
14the 1980s itisclear that the percentageof respondents stated that unionswere perceivedto
be a good thing increased through the decade.
What of the other explanations? Data limitations and the identification issue make it
impossible for us to address the hypothesis that the individual-level demand for unionism has
fallen. it is, however, possible to shed some light on the possibility of management
opposition by considering the following question asked to the managers of establishments that
do not have any union members in the 1990 Workplace Industrial Relations Survey:
Wow would you describe management's general attitude towards trade union membership
among employees at rhLc establLchment. Is management....
in favour of trade union membership
not In favour of It
or neutral about it?
Table VI reports descriptive statistics on the responses to this question. It is clear that
managers are more likely have an unfavourable disposition towards unions in manufacturing
establishments where the proportion not in favour is 0.46 as compared to an average across
all establishments of 0.32. As the largest falls in union recognition were in manufacturing
this clearly points in the right direction (of course, we would also have liked to know
changes in managerial attitudes but, unfortunately, the question was only asked in the 1990
survey).
In Table VII we examine the hypothesis that unfavourable management attitudes were
more prevalent in those establishments set up in the 1980s. We do this by estimating a
simple logit model with a dependent variable coded 1 if management were not in favour of
unions and 0 otherwise. The 'Established in the 1980s variable is included as an
15independent variable. We report separate specifications for private manufacturing and non-
manufacturing and report models which include the set of control variables used for the
recognition models in Table V.
In private-sector manufacturing establishments there is some evidence that managerial
attitudes.towardsunions wereless favourable in establishments that were set up in the 1980s.
Despite the smallsamplesize,theestimated coefficient on"Establishedin the1980s"is
estimated to be positiveandsignificant (at the10 percentlevel). The marginal effect in
column (1) suggests, ceteris paribus, that managers were some 23 percent more likely to
have an unfavourable view of unions in newly set-up establishments. Hence, increased
managerial opposition to unions seems important in the sector where the largest falls in
recognition status occurred. Effects are, however, insignificantly different from zero in
private services.
A final hypothesis, that "unions kill firms", because the cost increasing aspect of
union rent-seeking activity ultimately drives union firms out of business (Freeman and
Kleiner, 1993) can also briefly be examined since a sub-set of the 1984 survey establishments
were interviewed again to construct the panel element of the 1990 survey. A sample of the
trading sector establishments in the 1984 survey were re-sampled and the survey investigators
identified 87 plant closures (Millward et aL, 1992)." The proportion of these with manual
union recognition was .480, as compared to .491 for the population of trading sector
establishments; for non-manual recognition, comparable proportions were .291 for the
closures and .338 for the population. There is clearly no evidence here for the hypothesis
that the exit rate of establishments displays a positive correlation with union recognition
status. This is importint for our hypothesis that emphasises failure to organise new
16establishments set up in the 1980s, as differences in exit rates would bias such a conclusion.
IV. Condudlzw Remarks
This paper documents and evaluates the reasons for the dramatic decline in union
presence observed in the British labour market through the 1980s. It focuses on trends in
union recognition drawing on data from the three Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys of
1980, 1984 and 1990. Our paper is rather different from earlier British work since we are
principally interested in changes over time, and because of the way in which we examine
time-specific effects. Some strong results emerge from the analysis. Much of the decline
has been due to falls within specific sectors. Hence the 1980s has seen big falls in union
presence both in sectors where they have traditionally been strong (private sector
manu6cturing) and where they have been relatively weak (private sector services). The
probability of union recognition is seen to depend importantly on the nature of the product
and labour market at the time in which an establishment is initially set up. As such it seems
that union recognition became significantly harder to achieve in new establishments in the
l98O199O time period and it is this, rather than derecognition of unions in existing
establishments, which has been driving the downturn in unionization. Within private sector
manufacturing, traditionally a stronghold of union activity, it appears that a 1980s increase
towards unfavourable managerial attitudes to trade unions can explain some of this fall.
The findings of this paper appear to paint a bleak picture for the future ability of
unions to organise new establishments, at least in the private sector (more in-depth analysis
of the public sector is certainly warranted, but beyond the scope of this paper). Given the
trends observed in the British labour market in the 1980s and the increased importance of
17new, smaller establishments, we see no reason why the dramatic declines in union presence





















Sources:Bain and Price (1980), Price and Bain (1983) and Waddington (1992)
19Figure 11: TheComnonents of the 1980-90 Decline in Union Recognition
Decline in manufacturing U Decline in services

















20Fi2ure ITT: Trends in Me Dated Union Recotnition 1970-1990
sw
PrivatuNan—manufacturing
1. The year definition is based on responses to the establishmentage question from the
1990 Workplace Industrial Relations Survey.
2. The reported profiles are 5-year moving avenges of weighted data.
3. Means of smoothed union recognition in establishments set up in the 1970s are:
manual manufacturing 0.50; manual non-manufacturing 0.26; manual public sector
0.82; non-manual manufacturing 0.25; non-manual non-manufacturing 0.19; non-
mznual public sector 0.90.
4. Means of smoothed union recognition in establishments set up the 1980s axe: manual
manufacturing 0.25; manual non-manufacturing 0.19; manual public sector 0.74;
non-manual manufacturing 0.16; non-manual non-manufacturing 0.15; non-manual
public sector 0.82.
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Notes.Fi2ure IV: General Attitudes Towards British Unions












i gbo I 990Table I: Des,iotjye Statistics en Union Retention. 1930-1990
Proportion of Eszablithmeots With Recognised Unions For Manual Worker,









0.61 1720 0.62 1153 0.48 1831
Public Sector 0.84 611 0.91 753 0.73 561
Private Sector 0.50 1169 0.44 1095 0.37 1270
Private Sector
Manufacturing





466 0.38 515 0.31 654












0.50 1934 0.54 2010 0.43 2058
Public Sector 0.91 702 0.98 825 0.84 630
Private Sector 0.29 1232 0.22 1185 0.25 1429
Private Sector
Manufacturing
0.28 702 0.26 592 0.23 630
Other Private
Sector
0.30 530 0.30 593 0.26 798
Nota.
I. Calculated from the 1980. 1984 and 1990 Workplace ledustrial Relations Survey.. Weighted psopostion. (weights am r
WIRS. based on the Census of Employment thne yean prior lb the survey, to allow for the deliberate ovettatiipli of baser
astablisbanenta).
2. Number, differ in 1980 from those reported in the WIRS reference book. (Millward aM Slevon.. 1986; MiI1*rd ci sI., 1992)
dueto different treatment of missing value. (assigned to nonmcoguition in the book., but treated as miing here).
3. The number of establishments are the unweighted number,.
23Table 11:DciioIiveStatitci= Utho. Dtitv sad Cov.n. 1930-1090
Proporuoc of Woikers wbo ate (Jnka Membeze
(propoaioe of Ml-timen. £980; all workea. 1984 sad 1990)
Puepoflioc of Woikea Coveted by
CollectiveBargaining
1980 1984 £990 1984 1990
•
All Ettabtishmeati 0.62 0.53 0.48 0.71 0.54
Public Sector 0.73 0.80 0.72 0.95 0.78
Private Sector 0.64 0.56 0.48 0.64 0.51
Mwufucnuing
Other Private 0.33 0.30 0.27 0.41 0.33
Sector
Note..
I. Source: Daniel and MilIward (1983); Millward and Stevsas (1990); MIUWIId at .1. (1993).
2. The wijo. covenge quettion wu not .td in 1980.
Table 111: Deconnosition of (be Anrente Decline ii Union Reconthioe. 1980-1990
Percea tag. — thing. in recognition
ro.sIiing fmm
Manual Trade lime., Rnitioec
Petcentage point change (Percentage of
Noe.miaual Trade Unioc k.cognitioec
Peceitage point change (Percentage of
. total change) Iotdcbange)








Total change. 1980.1990 12.79 (100) 7.32 (100)
Notes.
I. BasSo. decomposition described in text.
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Ic: r -- r t(2q—75.67
PnJs. coot
I. Lagi. coellicksi (.n4.rd men) as, repastS. . ad"' deos n.dsic.I mipi&.ace at lbs 0)0. 0.0$ cad 0.01 .igGc.ac. hv,i.
26Punt. M.a.6c0u4i1 P1.ivtt. Hoe-rn... t.ctnia1
(I) (2) 0) (4) <5) (6)


































La1-Ijk.Iibood -31330 -23031 -229.06 -337.33 -264.24 -262.71
Naa6sreIEa.bliâawcs. $44 ill 514 500 500 . 300
cit lotaioa or .unpi. u.c.loyu.su . . 0.20 - - 0.16
z°(I) its toe iotkaioc of .1$ng... icflttioc - - 0.04 - - 1.7$
Muin.J siftel(at EsbIithcd in tic 1910. -0.331 4.303 .0.266 -0.171 4.114—
-0.114
(7) (I) (9)










Iadu*y qua.i-rssi. —badit sins of itt-lip - - -
Iaduwy quu-nca p.c buditii.. of isl-.ap .apsnd - - -
GOP gsu'* . - 4334
(0-fl')
I.oj-IiSItbood -17491 —116.57 -114.93
Number at Egebliobotsal. 442 442 442
t(l) cit (or iaIa.ion ot.gnsl. uscIonsS - - I5
X°(l) sad (or incluito, of .npl. mAgic. - 3.12
M.si...J elk" (cc Easblithcd Ic t 1910. 4.044 4.000 4.047
f-o1is cosltlci.a.. A.yqsnlk s.kcd mcciIap.nshas..
Thc ...oad l.a qci&ajaa. (or ciA pccp irnIud.. the lSlo.s. s.oic. .a.bathotsu S. dS..i ..asI. pa-dot. pscposdc..I f.t.c UK asid;
1ic11.-tis; 10 scgia..l domotic..




27Table VI: Manarexial Athtude, To union, Where No Union Meirthe,, Prt
.




AU Establishmcoi, 0.020 0.3 18 0.663 476
Public sector 0.000 0.0S2 0.918 5
Private
manuiacruri
0.008 0.462 0.531 134
Other private sector 0.024 0.270 0.706 335
Notes.
I. Calculated From the 1990 WorkplacelndusuialRelations Survey. Sued on nsaaageiial reaposaca in a*ablisbmems, with no
union members. Weighted proportions.
Table VII:Losil Eatj,,ninof Manancrial Unfava.r.ble View, oa Union,


















I. Logic estimates.Asymptotic standard exxon in parentheaca.
2. Controls are those includedS the recognition model, in coluam (2)ofTibiaV. Therewe lao faw observation. toestimate
.public sector equation.
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ENDNOTES
1.Fatherand Krueger (1993) provide a recent empirical evaluation of US trends in
individual union membership and Riddell (1993) draws a contrast between the United
States and Canada.
2.See Millward et al. (1992) for an extremely comprehensive review of these data
• source&
3-Theuse of recognition as an indicator of union presence has been common in
empirical studies by labour economists using the Workplace Industrial Relations
Surveys: see the several papers on wages by Blanchflower and Oswald or Stewart
(examples are Blanchflower and Oswald, 1990, or Stewart, 1990) or the various
papers on the effects of unions on non-wage outcomes (Blanchflower et a!., 1991, or
Machin and Wadhwani, 1991, are two examples of these). It also has the virtue of
being exogenous in the sense that it is determined in an earlier time period, probably
at or around the date at which an establishment is set up: we elaborate much more
on the historical feature of the determination of recognition status below.
4. SeeMetcalf's (1993a, 1993b) comprehensive surveys of the UK evidence or Freeman
and Meciofrs (1984) book on the US work.
315. Goslingand Machin (1993) report evidence in line with thissuggesting that wage
inequality would have risen by about 15-20% less than it did between 1980 and 1990
had the union structure of 1980 still prevailed in 1990.
6.Ofcourse, the 25 employee cut-off point excludes a sizable (considerably less
unionized) proportion of aggregate employment and this should be borne in mind
when interpreting the results reported in this paper.
7.Miliward(1992) provides a summary of papers based on thesurveys up to 1992.
8.Inlogit models marginal effects are computed as $P(1-P) where P is themean of the
dependent variable and fi is the relevant estimated coefficient.
9.Thepredsewordingoftheeyquestionisas follows: in l98Oand 1984 "How
long ago didthisestablishment first engage in its main activity?"; in 1990 "Howlong
has this establishment been operating here at this address?". Therange of responses
also differs. In 1980 and 1984 responses were banded into 1-3years, 3-5 years, 5-10
years, 10-25 years and 25 or more years. In 1990 responses were continuousup to
20 years and then open-ended as 20 or moreyears.
10.Forcompleteness, note that for non-manual recognition the comparable rise in the
marginal effect associated with age demonstrates an evensharper increase from 0.04 to 0.16.
11.Also,some recent evidence (Geroski, Gregg and Desjonqueres, 1993)suggests that
this may have accelerated in the recession of theearly 1990s, at least in the large
firms that they survey.
12. This variable was mapped in at 2-digitindustry-level from the relevant Census of
Production and is defined as (sales -materialcosts -avengewage) I number of
workers. Note that, for data matchingreasons, capital costs are not deducted. We
did, however, experiment with netting out capital costs with little differenceto the
results. These additional tests are discussed below.
13. Rather than simply use this "Established in the l980s"variable we also included a set
of dummy variables indicating theyear of set-up in the 1980s (except for 1989 where
all new establishments did not haverecognition). These results (available on request)
pointed to a negative effect in each year after 1979.
14-Despitethe fact that one of the included controls isa single-site dummy variable it
is also possible that effectsmay be different in newly established single independent
establishments as compared to those that arepart of a multi-establishment enterprise
(we thank a referee for this comment). Estimatingseparate equations comparable to
column (1) of Table V for single-site establishmentsand for establishments that
belong to a multi-plant organisation producedvery similar marginal effects associated
with the "Established in the 1980s" variable.Hence, the failure to organise new
establishments seems to hold for new firms and fornewly set up establishments in
existing firms.15. As noted above (footnote 10) the quasi-rents variable does not net out capital costs.
Whilst we could not get a capital stock series to perfectly match the industry
classification of the quasi-rents variable, we did also construct a rents variable that
nets out capital costs, albeit at a slightly higher level of aggregation. Effects
remained much the same as in Table V when this variable was used: more
experiments of this kind are reported in Disney et a!. (1993).
16. We are extremely grateful to Neil Millward for providing us with the serial codes for
the 87 establishments who closed between 1984 and 1990.